We examine the role of macroeconomic ‡uctuations, asset market liquidity, and network structure in determining contagion and aggregate losses in a …nancial system. Systemic instability is explored in a …nancial network comprising three distinct, but interconnected, sets of agents -domestic banks, international …nancial institutions, and …rms. Calibrating the model to advanced country banking sector data, we obtain sensible aggregate loss distributions which are bimodal in nature. We demonstrate how systemic crises may occur and analyse how our results are in ‡uenced by liquidity risk and bank heterogeneity. We conclude by discussing our model in the context of the ongoing …nancial crisis.
from other disciplines. One such approach draws on methods from statistical physics which have previously been extensively applied in epidemiology (Anderson and May, 1991; Newman, 2002; Meyers, 2007) . These models permit network structure to be arbitrary and opaque, enabling analysis of the resilience of large, complex systems to unexpected shocks. Weber (2004, 2006) , Horst (2007) , and Kühn (2006, 2008) study the e¤ect of credit contagion in a network of …rms to evaluate aggregate credit risk losses in banks' portfolios using mean-…eld arguments. Gai and Kapadia (2008) develop a model of the interbank network and draw on percolation theory (Callaway et.al, 2000; Watts, 2002; Newman, 2003) to show how banking systems can be "robust-yet-fragile" in nature. But to obtain analytical solutions, the networks used in these models posit only one type of agent -…rms or banks -and so only capture a subset of the …nancial linkages in a typical system. And they often impose homogeneity assumptions on the balance sheets of agents and/or on the distribution of the size of exposures.
By contrast, the real-world …nancial system involves a diverse set of agents. And it is clear that it also contains signi…cant variation in the size of …nancial institutions, the structure of their balance sheets and the extent to which the various players are linked together. Such heterogeneity -of balance sheets and of patterns of interconnectedness between …nancial players -poses a substantial challenge for the modelling of …nancial crises.
In this paper, we address this issue and explore systemic stability in a more general …nancial network structure than those considered hitherto. Speci…cally, we model a heterogeneous …nancial network comprising three distinct, but inter-connected, layers -banks, international …nancial institutions (commercial and investment banks), and …rms -that display the characteristics of complex systems. Since this rich interaction structure precludes analytical solutions, we calibrate our model to available balance sheet data from advanced country banking sectors to obtain plausible numerical solutions for bank-speci…c and system-wide loss distributions. And we examine how macroeconomic ‡uctuations, network structure, and asset market liquidity interact to determine contagion and aggregate losses in a typical …nancial system.
Our results show how macroeconomic shocks may precipitate the initial failure of …nancial institutions due to credit losses. Critically, however, these shocks may be propagated through the direct interlinkages of claims and obligations amongst and between banks and international …nancial institutions. This creates the possibility of default cascades, and we identify the minimum size of macroeconomic shock necessary for system-wide failure to occur. The non-linearity of the system makes our aggregate loss distribution bimodal in character, with a main peak associated with a relatively healthy banking sector and a much smaller peak in the extreme tail associated with outbreaks of contagious default. We also show how default across the network is ampli…ed by asset price e¤ects and highlight the cushioning role of bank capital bu¤ers.
In addition, we …nd that greater heterogeneity of banks' balance sheets leads to more realistic outcomes, characterised by the failure of some, but not all, banks in extreme scenarios. Some of our results clearly resonate with the ongoing …nancial crisis. In particular, the model demonstrates how complex …nancial systems are prone to potential system-wide breakdown of the type that was observed most clearly following the failure of Lehman Brothers. More generally, it highlights how strong asset liquidity interactions and low capital bu¤ers (or, conversely, high leverage) may have intensi…ed the severity of the crisis.
The …ndings of our paper also complement recent modelling approaches used by central banks to measure and assess systemic risk. Elsinger et.al (2006) use an option pricing framework to measure banks' probability of default and combine it with a model of the Austrian interbank network to generate aggregate loss distributions. Alessandri et.al (2009) integrate macroeconomic risk factors, credit losses, income, and assetside feedbacks in an empirical model of the UK banking network and illustrate the possibility of bimodal system-wide loss distributions. But these models rely on detailed knowledge of balance sheet structure and the network of exposures is pre-de…ned. As such, they cannot easily be used to assess the implications of the …nancial linkages created through credit risk transfer, or from shocks to …nancial players (such as hedge funds) beyond the core domestic banking system nor to analyse the implications of changes to the structure of the …nancial system on its robustness.
Notwithstanding all of this, our model clearly has some important limitations -in particular, our desire to capture the complexities of the …nancial system has come at the cost of allowing relatively little role for behaviour (apart from permitting banks to sell assets prior to default), and modelling the contagion process in a relatively mechanical fashion, holding the size and structure of interbank linkages constant as default propagates through the system. Whilst it is true that the very rapid spread of contagion we have sometimes observed in recent times may suggest that there is limited scope for agents to react before they are a¤ected, incorporating a stronger role for behaviour would clearly enrich our analysis. Therefore, this paper should be seen as a …rst step towards an integrated model of systemic risk that both takes the complexity of the …nancial system seriously and incorporates realistic behavioural responses.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an informal discussion of our approach and explains how shocks can be propagated and ampli…ed in a stylised …nancial system comprising di¤erent types of agent. Section 3 is a self-contained presentation of the formal apparatus and section 4 discusses model calibration.
The baseline aggregate loss distribution obtained from stochastic simulations and the comparative static properties of the model are discussed in section 5. Section 6 relates the model and some of our results to the ongoing …nancial crisis and a …nal section concludes.
A Stylised Financial System and the Transmission of Shocks
The …nancial system in our model can be viewed as a core-periphery structure with three inter-connected layers.
A network of core domestic banks sits at the centre of the system. A distinguishing feature of this group is that each bank interacts with all other banks, i.e the (sub)-network is complete. This structure re ‡ects the importance of core banks within money markets and payments systems in national …nancial structures.
Beyond this group of core banks lies a group of international …nancial institutions. These can be thought of as international banks, but could also include other …nancial entities such as hedge funds, pension funds and insurance companies. Unlike domestic banks, the (sub)-network structure of international banks is incomplete and exhibits a 'small world'property -each international bank interacts with most institutions in its immediate vicinity and only interacts with more 'distant' institutions with some probability. The sparseness of the links between international banks relative to the complete network of domestic banks re ‡ects the much greater diversity of institutions in this sector, both in terms of activity and location. It is also consistent with recent evidence on the …nancial interlinkages between international banking centres (von Peter, 2007) .
The outermost layer of the …nancial system comprises …rms in the …nancial system. Firms are assumed not to lend to each other or own shares in each other, so are not connected to each other in any way. Recent e¤orts by Kühn (2006, 2008) take into account economic dependencies such as trade credit but, for the sake of tractability of our model, we sidestep such considerations. Each …rm is, however, exogenously assigned a credit rating (investment grade or non-investment grade). This introduces some correlation in their performance following a shock.
Although the three layers of the …nancial system are distinct, each group is linked to the others. Domestic and international banks can lend to and borrow from each other, and they can also lend to and own shares in …rms. These …nancial relationships are modelled as random graphs. In other words, there is a link between entities belonging to di¤erent layers with a given probability. These probabilities are independent and are drawn from log-normal distributions. These random links mean banks can di¤er in terms of the lending to and equity holdings in …rms.
Our use of random graph techniques to model the …nancial interlinkages between di¤erent types of agents can be viewed as a metaphor for the opacity and reach of modern …nancial instruments. Policymakers have highlighted the way in which credit derivatives have enabled …nancial entitles to 'slice and dice' credit risk to the peripheries of the …nancial system (Bank of England, 2007, and Trichet, 2008) . The value of such instruments and related exposures have been di¢ cult to assess and monitor, justifying a probabilistic treatment such as the one we adopt here. Figure 1 illustrates the …nancial system. In what follows, banks and …rms are represented as nodes in a network. The network we consider is directed. Most links between nodes re ‡ect credit relationships where one entity extends a loan to another. Incoming links represent assets (i.e. monies owed to the entity by a counterparty), whereas outgoing links represent an entity's liabilities. The links between banks and …rms can also represent equity relationships. In this case, shares owned by the bank are assets and are incoming links. As explained below, including equity relationships provides us with a device for incorporating …re sales and asset side feedbacks into the model.
The typical balance sheets for domestic and international banks is presented in Figure 2 . The total assets of a bank comprise (i) shares of …rms; (ii) loans to …rms; (iii) loans to other domestic and international banks; and (iv) safe assets such as government securities. The liabilities of a bank comprise (i) borrowing from other domestic and international banks; (ii) external customer deposits; and (iii) a capital bu¤er. The initial capital bu¤er is assumed to be a …xed percentage of total assets -as such, it may also be interpreted as a measure of leverage. Figure 3 depicts the mapping from shocks to systemic risk in our model. Macroeconomic disturbances can trigger …rm defaults that cause some …nancial institutions to incur credit losses on loans to …rms and losses on holdings of …rm equities, which can potentially trigger asset …re sales or outright default. Alternatively, a …nancial institution may fail for idiosyncratic reasons without there being a macroeconomic shock (e.g. because of fraud). The knock-on e¤ect of an initial default of a …nancial institution can trigger contagion amongst …nancial institutions that are directly linked. But direct contagion is reinforced by mark-to-market losses as asset price declines associated with …re sales force other …nancial institutions to write down the value of their assets. 3 Asset-side feedbacks can thus amplify the e¤ect of shocks to the system -particularly when the market for key assets is illiquid.
3 A Statistical Model of the Financial System
Financial relationships between di¤erent types of agent
The …nancial system consists of N (T ) agents who belong to one of three types: (1) domestic banks; (2) international banks; (3) …rms. We denote the number of agents of each type by N (1) , N (2) ; and N (3) respectively, where
Each agent is represented by a node on a directed graph and linked to each other through their assets, 
and
where S xy ij ; T xy ij 2 R + are random variables that describe the extent of the exposure. 4 The loan sizes S xy ij between di¤erent types of agent follow log-normal distributions with where xy and xy are the mean and standard deviation of the associated normal distribution, respectively. In section 4, we demonstrate the validity of this modeling assumption. The scale of equity holdings in …rms by domestic and international banks, T xy ij , also follows a log-normal distribution with mean xT and standard deviation xT . As currently set up, the implicit equity price is set equal to one, though as we shall discuss below, it may be less than one in the event of …re sales.
We suppose that the connectivity variables c 
where c xy and d xy 2 R + are the average number of lending, borrowing, and equity links between agents of type x and y. The Kronecker delta function a;b takes the value 1 if a = b and 0 otherwise.
The …nancial relationships between di¤erent types of agent can now be given a convenient matrix form. 
Financial relationships between agents of the same type
Since all core domestic banks holds assets against every other domestic bank, c 11 ij = 1: This forms a complete network of the core banks through their lending relationships. The value of the loan agreements between domestic banks is assumed to follow a log-normal distribution with mean 11 and standard deviation 11 :
Firms do not hold assets or equity against each other or against domestic and international banks. Hence
Interactions between international banks take place on a small-world network. Such networks are characterised by (i) their clustering coe¢ cient, which re ‡ects the clique-like relationship between a node and its nearest neighbours; (ii) long-range links between 'distant'nodes which result in a short average path length (i.e. a short average number of links between any two nodes).
The construction of matrix c 22 is based on the algorithm proposed by Watts and Strogatz (1998) . We arrange the nodes of international banks on a one-dimensional (ringed) lattice and connect each node to the c 22 nearest neighbours. Next, starting with the …rst bank, we randomly rewire with probability w 22 each of its immediate neighbour links to another bank, which is uniformly selected over all international banks.
This procedure is iterated over all international banks. The total number of nearest-neighbour and rewired links is c changes from a regular structure to a small-world network as we turn on the rewiring probability.
Taken together, our assumptions on connectivity lead to a restricted matrix and imply that our …nancial system can be represented as
Bank balance sheets
We now describe the bank balance sheets depicted in Figure 2 more formally. The total assets of bank i
where
and B x i denotes safe assets such as government bonds. The set N xy i denotes the set of institutions j (type y) against whom bank i holds an asset. Similarly, E
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i denotes the set of …rms j whose shares bank i owns.
The total liabilities are
where D x i denotes external liabilities such as customer deposits and the initial capital bu¤er K x i is a …xed fraction r < 1 of assets on the balance sheet, i.e
As before, N yx i denotes the set of banks j (type y) to whom bank i has a liability.
If the initial assets of each bank drawn from the asset distribution exceeds initial liabilities, the liabilityside of the balance sheet is 'topped'up by customer deposits to ensure that total assets are equal to total liabilities. Conversely, if liabilities exceed assets, the di¤erence is accounted for on the asset side by holdings of government bonds.
Crisis dynamics and contagion
In our simulations, a bank will default if its total losses are greater than its capital bu¤er. We consider a two-state model, i.e., during each instance, t 2 N, of our simulations bank i (category x) is either solvent
. De…ning the total losses incurred by bank i as L x i;tot (t) 0, we obtain the following update rule:
where (: : :) is the Heaviside function. In what follows, we specify the various components that contribute to bank losses.
A crisis is instigated by shocks to …rms. We model …rm default using a Bernoulli model of the sort widely used in the credit risk literature (Gordy, 2000) and in the risk management industry. Firms are classi…ed according to their creditworthiness, which is quanti…ed by a probability of default, PD 2 (0; 1). We split the …rms into two categories: (i) investment-grade: PD IG and (ii) non-investment grade: PD N IG . The PD for …rm i (in category ) is given by
where j G j < 1 is the contribution from an aggregate macroeconomic shock, PD 2 (0; 1) is the probability of default for category and j i j < 1 is an idiosyncratic variation, which adds heterogeneity. The aggregate and …rm-speci…c shocks are drawn from normal distributions. The means and standard deviations are given by G 0 and G > 0 (aggregate shock) and i = 0, i > 0 (idiosyncratic shock). The scales for the means and standard deviations are taken such that the shocks remain within their bounds.
Firms default according to a series of Bernoulli trials. Similar to the case of banks, …rm i may be either solvent (
Starting with a fully solvent system, each …rm is set to default, i.e., we ‡ip 3 i from 0 to 1, with probability PD i .
Default severs the connections (loans and shares) between banks and …rms. We assume a zero recovery rate for loans and also suppose that share prices of the defaulted …rms drop to zero. 5 So losses from …rms for bank i (type x) are:
Bank i will default from the …rm credit shocks if L
Contagion in the …nancial system may spread through direct …nancial linkages. If bank i defaults, then another bank, j (type y) holding assets against bank i, will su¤er losses. At this point, we assume that the …nancial counterparties of defaulting banks lose all of their interbank assets held against that bank. 6 At time t; the counter-party losses for bank j amount to
Contagion may also spread indirectly as a result of mark-to-market losses on balance sheets brought on by …re sales of assets by banks in distress. As any individual bank incurs losses, it is likely to take defensive actions to protect itself from failure. One option, exercised by some institutions since the advent of the current …nancial crisis, is for the bank to sell assets. Therefore, we allow banks to sell equities when they are in distress (we suppose that debt is completely illiquid and therefore cannot be sold). Speci…cally, banks engage in …re sales of equities once losses mount above a certain fraction 2 (0; 1) of their capital, i.e.,
Let Q(t) 0 be the equity held by banks participating in a …re sale at time t, and Q > 0 be the total equity held by all banks. The dynamics of the equity price, q(t) 0, are determined by a form of "cash in the market" pricing Gale, 2005, and Cifuentes et. al, 2005) , where the price is reducing in the ratio of the equities for sale to the quantity of equities not being sold, a proxy for non-distressed potential buyers. We therefore write
where 2 R + is a parameter that measures the price impact of a …re sale. 7 If the market is extremely liquid, = 0 and there is no price impact from asset sales, whereas > 0 implies that equity prices fall sharply for a given amount of distressed assets on the market.
When the equity price falls, banks incur mark-to-market losses on their equity holdings. Bank j 0 s total losses at time t are thus given by
where the last term refers to losses incurred due to a fall in equity prices of …rms that did not default from the initial shock.
When one bank has defaulted, related counterparty and mark-to-market losses may cause other banks to default. This process continues iteratively, with continually updating counterparty and mark-to-market losses, until no further banks are pushed into default. 8 
Model Calibration
With reference to a real banking network, an attempt to describe its stability with this (or any other) model is contingent on a plausible calibration of model parameters to re ‡ect reality. Our calibration methodology focuses on deriving the statistics of balance sheet time-series data, which include exposure size and connectivity, and …tting them to our choices of the corresponding distributions. These time-series data are available 
Distributions of loan sizes between banks
We use quarterly regulatory data provided by the UK Financial Services Authority on large exposures between the 17 major UK banks over the period 2004-2007 to calibrate the distribution of interbank loans between domestic banks. The data were …tted to a log-normal probability density function (PDF) with mean and standard deviation, of approximately, $1; 200 million and $1; 500 million, respectively. The parameters for the PDF were calibrated to 11 = 20:40 and 11 = 0:98. Figure 5 (a) plots the …tted PDF against actual data on a semi-logarithmic scale. 9 The distribution of loan sizes based on actual data appears to follow a fat-tailed distribution, supporting our choice of a log-normal loss distribution.
To calibrate the distribution of loan sizes between domestic and international banks, we consider a system of 120 foreign banks in 15 countries (i.e. For claims held by UK banks against foreign banks, this process gives us a mean and standard deviation of approximately $600 million and $700 million, and calibrated distribution parameters 12 = 19:25 and 9 The PDF was produced by binning the bilateral exposures and normalizing the weight attributed to each bin. The circles in Figure 5 correspond to bin centres.
1 0 Note that we are assuming here that all international banking claims are channeled through the 17 core UK banks and the 8 largest banks in each foreign country. deviation of $400 million and $800 million, respectively, with 21 = 18:26 and 21 = 1:31.
We assume that each foreign bank lends to all of the other seven banks in its own country to calibrate the distribution of loan sizes between international banks. As we do not have access to data on interbank lending within foreign banking systems, we assume that lending between banks in foreign countries has the same statistics as lending between UK banks.
On top of these intra-country linkages, we assume that each foreign bank is also linked to foreign banks in other countries. To gauge the distribution of loan sizes we use cross-border claims data from the BIS.
Once again, since the data are aggregated, we scale the number of banks in each country. The corresponding PDF is plotted in Figure 5 
Structure of balance sheets
To estimate the relative sizes of the di¤erent components on the balance sheets of domestic and international banks, we use published accounts data for the 17 UK banks and corresponding data for foreign banks as reported by BankScope (bankscope.com).
The average total asset size for UK banks and foreign banks are £ 400 billion and £ 150 billion respectively.
For UK banks, government bonds, equity, loans to …rms and interbank assets (i.e. the sum of claims against both foreign and UK banks) make up 5%; 5%, 77:5% and 12:5% of the assets, respectively, on average. The data from BankScope suggests that the balance sheets for foreign banks are similar -we consequently use the same composition for foreign bank balance sheets.
Connections between banks
The domestic banking system is taken to be fully-connected, i.e., each domestic bank is connected to each of the 16 other domestic banks. Consequently, c 11 = 16. The average number of connections for claims held by domestic banks against international banks is given by taking the average total interbank assets for a UK bank (12:5% of $400 billion), subtracting the average total assets held against other UK banks (16 $ 1; 200 million) and dividing by the average size of a single exposure between a UK and foreign bank (i.e. $600 million). This yields c 12 = 51, i.e., each UK bank is exposed to 51 foreign banks.
To work out the connections for international banks, we …rst assume that each international bank is connected, on average, to 9 domestic banks (i.e. c 21 = 9). To begin with, we additionally assume that each international bank lends to the 7 other international banks in its own country. In line with the small-world nature of connections between international banks, the number of 'short-range'connections (i.e. between one international bank and other banks in the same country) is c 22 nn = 7. Consequently, the average number of 'long-range'connections to banks in other countries is estimated by taking from the average total interbank assets (12:5% of $150 billion), subtracting the average assets held against UK banks (i.e. $ 400 million 9), and those held against other banks in the same country (i.e. $ 1; 300 million 7) and dividing by the average size of a loan between foreign banks in di¤erent countries (i.e. $400 million). This gives us c 22 rw = 16, from which the re-wiring probability for the network is estimated as w 22 = 0:77%.
Distribution of loans to …rms and equity holdings
We assume that there are 50; 000 …rms. In the absence of data on individual bank lending to …rms, we take our breakdown of assets and assume that each loan and equity holding is, on average, $50 million and $2 million, respectively. As we have already inferred the average size of the balance sheet and contributions from total equity and loans, we can easily work out the average number of connections necessary in the …nancial system. This gives us, c 13 = 6; 200 and d 13 = 10; 000, and c 23 = 3; 750 and d 23 = 2; 375 respectively. 
Probabilities of default

Additional parameters
In addition to the statistically relevant model parameters discussed above, there are a few others worth clarifying.
Fire-sale trigger, : once a bank has lost 50% of its assets due to the combined e¤ects of …rm defaults, interbank contagion and mark-to-market losses on equity holdings, the bank will itself decide to put up its own tradeable assets for sale. These considerations are re ‡ected by taking = 0:5. Asset-to-capital ratio, r: banks' capital bu¤ers are initially set at r = 4% of total assets, a …gure calibrated from data contained in the 2005 published accounts of a range of large, international …nancial institutions. In some subsequent cases we allow for heterogenous r, varying from 4% to 24%. 
Results
Our goal is to generate a plausible aggregate loss distribution for the calibrated …nancial system and evaluate its characteristics. A thorough understanding of the aggregate losses in a banking system is of critical importance for policymakers concerned about systemic risk in the …nancial system. Standard industry models used by …nancial institutions and central banks do not typically examine the interaction between the nature of macroeconomic shocks and the degree of complexity implied by international …nancial linkages.
To the extent that these intertwine to generate signi…cant fat tails in the aggregate loss distribution, the potential underestimation of systemic risk could be signi…cant.
Baseline aggregate loss distribution
We start by performing a series of stochastic simulations for our calibrated …nancial system to obtain an aggregate loss distribution under baseline assumptions. Speci…cally, we assume that asset sales have no price impact ( = 0) and there are no aggregate macroeconomic shocks to …rms ( G = 0). During each simulation, we generate balance sheets where exposures are drawn from the connectivity and asset size distributions described above. Next, through a series of Bernoulli trials, we set some of the …rms to default.
These defaults are registered on the balance sheets of banks, possibly prompting bank defaults or …re sales.
Once the shock has run its course through the network and asset prices have adjusted, we measure the fraction of failed banks and the balance sheet losses for all banks. We perform 1,000 such simulations and then create a distribution for banking system assets lost. Figure 6 presents the normalized histogram for the number of defaulting …rms. As described in Section 3.4, …rms default according to a series of Bernoulli trials. Consequently, the number of failures from shocking all …rms is described by a Binomial distribution function. Figure 7 presents the PDF for the total size of losses from defaulted …rms, relative to the domestic and total banking systems. These distributions follow log-normal statistics, which is a result of our modeling assumptions for the distribution of loan and equity to …rms. The typical defaulting …rm is small in size relative to the …nancial system -the average size of a …rm in default is 0:003% of total banking system assets. In the baseline, 220 …rms default on average in each simulation. Figure 8 presents the baseline aggregate loss distribution for the banking system, as a fraction of total system assets, for both domestic banks and the whole …nancial network. The system is robust since idiosyncratic …rm defaults of the scale observed above are insu¢ cient to cause any bank to default. Average system losses through idiosyncratic shocks are around 0:15% of the domestic banking system and 0:12% of the entire banking system. In other words, domestic and foreign banks are similarly a¤ected following idiosyncratic …rm failures.
Whilst this baseline case imposes unrealistic assumptions, it provides a useful benchmark for our subsequent analysis. Therefore, we now consider how the shape of this baseline aggregate loss distribution is in ‡uenced by macroeconomic shocks, asset market liquidity, and heterogeneity in banks'capital bu¤ers.
Aggregate macroeconomic shocks
Aggregate shocks to the …nancial system have an adverse impact on …rms and enter our model via the parameters G and G . An increase in G re ‡ects higher levels of …rm default, while a rise in G captures the variability and uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment. In what follows, we hold G …xed and
As a …rst exercise, we attempt to identity the scale of …rm default that triggers the …rst instances of complete banking system failure (that is, the failure of all domestic and international banks). Due to computational constraints, the results reported for each G were compiled from performing 500 draws of the shock and letting them run their course through the system. We …nd that the …rst instance of system-wide failure occurs at In 98:8%, 0:6% and 0:2% of cases, we have no banks, 1 bank and 2 banks failing, respectively. However, in 0:4% of instances, the entire network collapses. In these cases the initial credit shock reduces the capital bu¤er for banks holding loans and equity against the defaulting …rms, triggering the direct failure of a few banks. Interbank linkages then lead to direct contagion, with the similarity between banks in their capacity to absorb shocks contributing to the starkly bipolar result that leads to all banks failing once widespread contagion has broken out.
In Figure 9 , we also plot the average fraction of failed banks, indicated by the solid line with squares.
Further investigations at G = 0:06 and G = 0:08 reveal that, due to homogeneity in the banks' ability to withstand shocks, either one or two banks fail or the entire network collapses. We have no reason to assume that this behaviour is peculiar to our choices of G and take it as holding over our reported range.
Consequently, one may interpret the blue squares as the probability that the network will collapse. As G approaches 0:1, the probability for system-wide failure accelerates towards unity. At G 0:9, the curvature changes and we have an in ‡ection point. Drawing from the theory of complex systems (Albert and Barabasi, 2002), we identify this in ‡ection point as the phase transition for the system, where the probability mass is equally distributed between the two modes of the loss distribution. For even higher levels of macroeconomic shocks, the system will always collapse.
The highest default rates between 1920 and 2006 reported by Moody's were, 1:7% for ratings class A …rms and 11:1% for ratings class Ba …rms, equivalent to BB …rms under Standard & Poor's rating system (Moody's, 2007) . 12 This corresponds to a probability of default for the average …rm in our model of 4:5%, which is generated by taking G 0:045. For our model calibration, G = 0:045 was found to be su¢ cient to jeopardise the stability of the banking system, while assuming that the loss given default is 100% on all loans. If we relax this assumption, it suggests that the magnitude of macroeconomic shocks and associated credit risk that can generate a systemic failure in the absence of liquidity risk is not far above the worse levels experienced in the past. Figure 10 plots the aggregate loss distribution for the entire banking system on a semi-logarithmic scale.
The (thin) grey-line distribution is for the baseline scenario while the (thick) brown-line one is for the stressed scenario where G = 0:05. In the stressed scenario, the losses are orders of magnitude greater than those in the baseline and the distribution is bimodal. The probability mass is concentrated around, (i) small losses (around 1:5% of system assets) and (ii) a few extreme cases where approximately 16% of system assets are lost. These extreme cases re ‡ect the collapse of the entire …nancial system.
Liquidity risk
We now investigate the e¤ects of asset …re sales on the aggregate loss distribution. When banks are in distress and losses are incurred in excess of a fraction of the capital bu¤er, they sell their equity holdings.
The extent to which sales by one bank in ‡uence the balance sheets of other banks depends on the degree of liquidity, , prevailing in the equity market. Figure 11 shows the impact of incorporating liquidity risk on our results. It plots both the largest fraction and average fraction of failed banks as a function of G in both the baseline case where = 0 (dashed lines) and the = 0:7 case (solid lines). Market illiquidity leads to greater system fragility. In particular, the minimum critical macroeconomic shock necessary for system wide failure is lowered to c G = 0:02. However, the probability of this extreme event is low, as indicated by the average fraction of failed banks. Applying similar lines of reasoning as in the previous section, we interpret the average fraction of failed banks as the probability of observing system-wide failure. There is a phase transition at G 0:04, where the probability mass is equally distributed between the modes for low and extreme losses. The level of …rm credit risk associated with this scale of shock seems plausible when compared to levels of credit risk experienced in the past (see Section 6.1), even if we were to allow for loss-given defaults of less than 100%. That said, it would certainly be in the tails of the macroeconomic shock distribution. Figure 12 compares the aggregate loss distribution with, and without, asset-side feedback e¤ects. The (thin) grey-line distribution represents the case G = 0:02 with = 0, while the (thick) brown-line is for G = 0:02 with = 0:7. As might be expected, asset …re-sales broaden the aggregate loss distribution.
Heterogeneous capital bu¤ers
Our depiction of …nancial fragility so far has been stark -a change in the size of the macroeconomic shock around a critical value determines whether the entire …nancial system is susceptible to collapse or not. More realistically, one might expect intermediate outcomes, where the entire system does not collapse following a shock. Such situations, arguably, are more likely when some banks are better capitalised than others or less exposed to defaults (e.g. because they have a systematically less risky loan book). 13 We introduce greater heterogeneity amongst banks in our model by relaxing the assumption that they have the same capital bu¤er. Instead, we allow the capital bu¤er to vary from institution to institution, with r i drawn from a uniform distribution with support [0:04; 0:24]. Figure 13 plots the largest fraction and average fraction of failed banks as a function of G with = 0. Error bars for the standard deviation are provided for the average fraction of failed banks, which unlike in the previous section, is di¤erent from the probability of observing system wide failures. It is clear that introducing heterogeneity along these lines allows for the possibility that following a macroeconomic shock, only some banks fail but the entire network does not collapse. But, for su¢ ciently large , it is still the case that both curves converge to unity (not shown).
What does the Model Indicate about the Current Crisis?
Our results shed some light on the ongoing …nancial crisis. 14 In particular, they illustrate how complex …nancial systems can be prone to system-wide breakdown of the type that was threatened following the failure of Lehman Brothers and could have occurred had there not been substantial policy intervention.
Through its incorporation of …re sale e¤ects, our model also highlights the adverse amplifying e¤ects of mark-to-market losses on banks' balance sheets which have been critical throughout the turmoil. And it points towards the possibility that declining capital bu¤ers (or, conversely, increasing leverage) in the years preceding the crisis may have made the system more prone to systemic instability.
Strictly, such system-wide breakdown is triggered in our model by widespread default amongst …rms.
This may seem at odds with the unfolding of the crisis -notwithstanding the increase in defaults in the US Figure   11 , with liquidity e¤ects, a shock of this magnitude always leads in our model to system-wide breakdown.
And even if we were to allow more realistically for positive recovery rates, it seems likely that such a shock would lead to system-wide collapse in our model at least some of the time. Thus, the level of future credit risk investors could be anticipating in the current crisis matches with a level of credit risk that could in the model presented here lead to a failure of a signi…cant proportion of the banking system. And, if investors have concerns over the future solvency of institutions, they are likely to withdraw their funding immediately, which may trigger (funding) liquidity crises, as was seen for some banks.
This speaks to the importance of including a role for funding liquidity risk in a complete model of systemic risk (see also Aikman et al, 2009) . One key aspect of the crisis has been the reduction in both the availability and term of wholesale funding on o¤er as …nancial institutions have hoarded liquidity and concerns about counterparty default have grown. And funding liquidity risk has interacted with market liquidity risk as a reduced supply of funding has raised the risk of …nancial institutions having to sell assets to obtain funds.
Including these further sources of risk and contagion into the model would most likely reduce the size of the macroeconomic shock necessary for there to be a threat of a systemic crisis, and is clearly an important area for future work.
Conclusion
Modern …nancial systems are characterised by complex interlinkages and a diverse set of agents. Our paper develops a general framework to gauge systemic stability in the presence of such linkages and heterogeneity.
Calibrating using advanced country banking sector data, we use a model to illustrate how macroeconomic ‡uctuations, asset market liquidity, and network structure might interact to determine aggregate credit losses and contagion. Although our calibration is broad-brush in nature to emphasise the qualitative results of the model, the results illustrate how systemic stability might begin to be quanti…ed in a statistical fashion, particularly when data about the reach of modern …nancial instruments is limited and shocks are international in nature.
A thorough understanding of both the qualitative and quantitative features of aggregate loss distributions in the banking system is important for policymakers concerned with national and international systemic risk.
Our …ndings indicate that macroeconomic shocks and asset price feedback e¤ects intertwine to generate fat tails in these distributions and that large-scale …nancial disruption may be possible. We also show how the heterogeneity of bank balance sheets can give rise to more realistic situations in which some banks fail, but the overall system remains resilient. The model clearly illustrates how complex …nancial systems are vulnerable to system-wide breakdown of the type observed during the ongoing …nancial crisis, most obviously following the failure of Lehman Brothers.
Our model imposes a number of simplifying restrictions on connectivity and the calibration is broadbrush. Relaxing these restrictions and altering the topology of the network may a¤ect risk-sharing and change the degree to which shocks are dispersed safely across the …nancial system. A thorough evaluation of changing the network linkages between and among di¤erent types of agent is a task we leave for future
research. An even greater challenge is to incorporate more meaningful behavioural responses into this type of network model, whilst retaining the complexities in its structure. 
